1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (Springfield)
3	No. 3:18-cr-30001-WGY
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6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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8	vs.
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10	NIA MOORE-BUSH and DAPHNE MOORE
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14	For Hearing Before:
15	Judge William G. Young
16	Motion to Suppress/Final Pretrial
17	Haited Chates District Court
18	United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Springfield)
19	300 State Street Springfield, Massachusetts 01105
20	Monday, May 13, 2019
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23	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR Official Court Reporter
24	United States District Court One Courthouse Way, Room 5510, Boston, MA 02210
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Begins, 2:00 p.m.) 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Would counsel identify themselves. 4 5 MS. WAGNER: Good afternoon, your Honor, Katharine Wagner on behalf of the United States. 6 7 MS. BURKART: Good afternoon, your Honor, Amy 8 Burkart for the United States. 9 MS. THOMPSON: Good afternoon, Judge Young, Attorney Linda Thompson for Daphne Moore. 10 11 MR. O'CONNOR: And good afternoon, your Honor, my name's Tom O'Connor and I'm here on behalf of 12 Ms. Moore-Bush. 13 14 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 15 The Court has before it, and you may correct me once we've worked through these, really four separate 16 17 matters, two of them may be dealt with summarily and two are quite substantive indeed. 18 19 The first is the motion, um, for a bill of 20 particulars. No adequate showing has been made to warrant the issuance of a bill of particulars and that 21 motion is denied without hearing, with one exception. 22 23 want to know, from the government, who the government 24 contends are the co-conspirators, charged or uncharged,

in the drug conspiracy and in the money-laundering

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conspiracy? Those are the two overlapping conspiracies alleged here, isn't that right?

MS. WAGNER: That's correct, your Honor. And the government actually filed a letter under seal earlier in the case, around the time we did automatic discovery, that was sent to defendants that listed the indicted and -- well, unindicted co-conspirators in that -- in those two counts. So I think that that's on the record. I'd be happy to have my assistant go down and grab a copy of that if you'd like. But we have put it on the record.

THE COURT: Actually I would like, because I haven't focused on it, and for, um, the necessity of **Petruzziello** and **Campaglia** rulings, I'd like to know how we're going to start here.

You should understand that, um, I take the evidentiary rulings in a conspiracy case very seriously and if I have admitted in evidence, um, communications from a person who -- and this is a finding by the judge, not -- it's not a directed verdict, who at the close of the government's case I don't find, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, is a co-conspirator, I must strike that evidence out.

Now if that's any more than completely peripheral, it becomes a very serious matter indeed because my

experience has been that you do not unring the bell with a jury. I make those statements not critical of anyone, just that you must be very careful when introducing co-conspirator hearsay, because I try to police that in a fair and careful manner.

All right. So that's the order on the bill of particulars.

Then there's more than one motion, but motions directed to wiretap evidence, do I understand from the government that the government does intend to use wiretap evidence in this case?

MS. WAGNER: We do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Against both defendants?

MS. WAGNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Those motions are denied.

What gives rise to these motions, I have to say, is an unfortunate predilection about which I have already complained to the United States Attorney and indeed all his predecessors, since they've been asking us for our views of law enforcement agents, that when they seek a wiretap, to list every possible name including -- and I don't say in this case, but I can remember cases where they're listing people "last name unknown," "first name unknown," and then they're seeking

to have a judicial determination as probable cause to believe that that person's committing a crime. That is an extremely unfortunate approach on the part of law enforcement.

When a wiretap is sought, what should be done is to list only the individuals in good faith whom the Assistant United States Attorney -- this shouldn't be surrendered to the law enforcement agencies, who the Assistant United States Attorney believes there is probable cause to believe that are committing the, um, crimes which would give rise to permission for a wiretap.

Indeed having read these motions -- I was not the issuing magistrate, it was Judge Mastroianni, but his practice is identical to mine, and I reviewed my own practices and I will tell you that in the last four years there have been only two wiretaps that I've issued without modification, all because the government always -- not always, in two instances they did not, but in every other instance where I've issued a wiretap I've narrowed it because they've asked for a judicial finding that there is then probable cause to believe that the person is committing the crimes that give rise to the wiretap. I don't do it and I see, in this case, that Judge Mastroianni didn't do it.

Now having said all that, and it needs to be said, it makes no difference here because he -- the warrant is amply supported for the wiretap that was issued, and once the wiretap is issued, the conduct of the officers here is, um, in my judgment under the controlling cases, is, um, not to be -- well it can be impugned, but it's perfectly appropriate here because of course the wiretap is a discovery device and what was discovered on the wiretap leads to further inquiry and the like. So the motion's denied -- those motions are denied.

Now that leaves us to the two motions that are of major significance here. And the first motion that I want to entertain and I'm eager for argument on is the motion having to do with the statements by Nia Moore-Bush. And so let me ask again, because we need to narrow what we're dealing with here.

Do you seek to introduce those statements in the trial?

MS. WAGNER: We would, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I take it that none of those statements are admissible against, um, Daphne Moore?

MS. WAGNER: That's correct, your Honor, and we would fashion them in such a way that they wouldn't run into any *Bruton* issues.

THE COURT: You're anticipating me and I

appreciate it. That means -- having dealt with <code>Bruton</code> issues in the past, there will obviously be no reference to her, Daphne Moore, nor will there be any reference to Jane Doe or some substitute for her, nor will there be any reasonable innuendo that a third -- well, Moore-Bush speaks of other people, but -- and other people, a number of whom are alleged co-conspirators. But I will be very careful that there be no reference, even by inference, to Daphne Moore, and the government should so understand it.

MS. WAGNER: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

So, Mr. O'Connor, my next question to you is I -- let me tell you where I am in my analysis here.

I had read all the papers as is my want. The actual transcript of the interview accompanied by a CD was not received by me really until this morning. Again I'm not being critical of anyone, but I'm not going to make any determination today because voluntariness is at issue and I can see that my duty is not only to read the transcript but to listen to the actual inflections and the voices of the people on this CD. So assume that I'm going to do that.

MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If I do that, I have to say I

don't see the need for an evidentiary hearing. I'm prepared on the law because your memorandum and affidavit certainly alerted me to it. But I ask you, are you pressing for an evidentiary hearing beyond the data that I have before me?

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I think it would be appropriate because, um, some of the issues that we raise in our brief -- perhaps some of the more central issues that we raise in our brief, have to do with the unrecorded portion of what happened that day, um, and what's reflected in the police report, not necessarily what's reflected in the recording or the transcription of the recording that I know has been submitted to the court.

THE COURT: All right. And what -- because while it is the government's burden of proof on voluntariness, from what sources do you want to introduce evidence? Whom do you want to call? Whom do you want to have called?

MR. O'CONNOR: Well that's a tough question,

Judge, because it is their burden and I don't

necessarily want to, um, assist them in meeting the

challenge, but I think it's pretty well laid out in my

brief. The real issue is, um, the circumstances around

the waiver in the first place.

THE COURT: No, no, if we're going to argue it and I give you an evidentiary hearing, we'll argue it then. But if you don't mind, let's go back to Ms. Wagner.

While I'm certainly going to do what I just said I was going to do, isn't the better part of value for you to put on the evidence to persuade me, recognizing that I will have read and listened to all of this, such other evidence as you may wish to call to establish what -- I know what your position is. I don't need one. I'm thinking the better part of value is to have one.

MS. WAGNER: Your Honor, the government would be happy to produce Special Agent Meehan, he was unavailable today, otherwise I would have had him in the court just in case. He's out of state. But we would be happy to bring him on and essentially go over -- what the government would elicit from him would be essentially what is in their investigation that you would have had or will have the opportunity to read --

THE COURT: I see I have police reports, but that's not the same thing as the recorded -- I wasn't saying I'm accepting police reports for evidentiary weight -- I don't fault you in giving them to me, but you need a witness for that. So what you're saying is you'll produce such a witness?

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MS. WAGNER: Essentially that's what I was saying, was that the expected testimony would be consistent with the police report that you have there. Additional details that the agent would be able to offer with respect to some allegations that the defendant has made with respect to availability of her --THE COURT: I'm of a mind to give an evidentiary hearing and I'm of a mind to do it in Boston. I mean -- I mean I'll be out here for the trial. I have other cases. I mean you know this, it's no surprise, each time I come, that's a day. So let's see if we can't -- the Clerk will suggest a time in Boston where we -- where I will have read and listened to what I said I would, we'll then receive evidence and have argument on that motion. (Pause.) THE COURT: How about 9:00 next Thursday, the 16th? MS. WAGNER: That would be fine, your Honor. THE COURT: And Mr. O'Connor? MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, your Honor, that's fine. THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Moore-Bush has every right to be present and so we're going to have to see to that. Very well, we'll schedule in Boston for that time. So that brings us -- but I won't entertain

1 any further argument on that. So that brings us to the pole-camera motion and 2 3 I've indicated that it's serious. What does -- does the government intend to use pole-camera evidence? 4 5 MS. BURKART: Yes, we do, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: As against both defendants? 7 MS. BURKART: That is correct. 8 THE COURT: All right. I think there are significant issues that, um, appertain to such evidence 9 and on this it's the government's -- it's the defense's 10 11 burden, I would think, to, um, ground a suppression 12 motion and so I will hear defense counsel. 13 Who wants to start? This is not openended. You 14 will understand that I have read your briefs, that's why 15 I think it's a significant motion. I've read what I 16 think are the significant Supreme Court and First 17 Amendment cases. This is an evolving area of the law. 18 MS. THOMPSON: I agree. 19 THE COURT: So being succinct, I'm eager to 20 hear your argument. 21 Ms. Thompson. 22 MS. THOMPSON: If you -- you're not inclined 23 to have an evidentiary hearing, I take it then? 24 THE COURT: No, I don't what -- what's an 25 evidentiary hearing going to give me?

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MS. THOMPSON: Well, first of all, the information that we have about exactly how these cameras work, what kind of cameras they were, how they got to be where they are, those are not issues that are clear in the discovery, and when I was doing my research on this matter I did read, um, Judge Sorokin's --THE COURT: Indeed. MS. THOMPSON: His opinion. THE COURT: As have I. MS. THOMPSON: And I noticed that there was a substantial amount of information in that opinion about the kinds of cameras that were used. So that I think that the record of the kinds of cameras, the kinds of, um, if there was any audio, how they are controlled, where they are controlled from, I think those are all important issues.

THE COURT: Well --

MS. THOMPSON: In this case.

THE COURT: Well maybe I'm -- and perhaps I am, Ms. Thompson, but maybe I'm a little too simplistic, but let me set out the parameters, and the government should correct me as to any of any of these to the extent they're factual matters.

It seems to me that the erection of this pole camera involved no trespass on Ms. Moore's property, um,

that the cameras, um, or camera was able to make realtime recordings and could be operable from a remote site
off the property, and had the capacity to zoom in. That
this was indeed, um, continuous coverage, at least
continuous coverage for portions of the surveillance,
and was not simply a still photo taken periodically.

Well let me turn to the government and say are all those assumptions in fact the case? Ms. Barsky.

MS. BURKART: Yes, that's accurate, your Honor, there's no trespass, the utility pole is across the street. The affidavit, that is quoted by both the defendants and the government, does lay out that in real-time it was possible for agents to zoom and that it was continuous coverage for approximately 8 months.

THE COURT: That's right. But let me press.

Did you zoom, are we going to see zoom pictures if I let this in?

MS. BURKART: Your Honor there have been produced in discovery, to the defendants, the images that were taken from the pole camera and they do show that when, um -- so I don't think that there is a factual dispute about it, that when it is in the unzoomed view it is Ms. Moore's driveway and a portion of the side of her house and that it is possible to zoom in and see things like license plate numbers and other

sort of information from that view, and both of those images have been produced in discovery and the government would expect to be using them at trial.

There is no audio, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, I'm -- I'm going to accept all those things factually and I don't see the need for any more detailed recitation.

Ms. Thompson, I'll hear you.

MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, your Honor.

We agree with the Court that this is an evolving area of, um, case law and, as the Court knows, we've relied heavily on the *Carpenter* case, which I know is not about a cameraman on an utility pole, but it does expand the, um, expectation of privacy to documents that are in the, um, control of third parties, that is there are new privacy expectations, I think, that arise in the *Carpenter* case, and in *Wurie* and *Riley* and *Jones* and the cases that we have cited.

So what we have here is a situation where unlike -- and I know that the, um, the cases -- some cases that have dealt with this have said that we live in an age of, um, surveillance cameras at businesses and places like that.

THE COURT: But this is not a security camera.

MS. THOMPSON: Absolutely not, it's not a

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security camera, it's not a camera that a neighbor put up, this is the government. This is the government deciding to have a continuous coverage, which they can continually search, that is, um -- because they have this -- and I don't know how the search -- how to search this camera, the film, once it's been taken, but I'm assuming it's digitally searchable and that the government can go back and search again and again over this 8-month period, and that that 8-month period is, um, covering -- I don't know how much time they actually spent zooming in and zooming out, we would know that from a -- we could find that out. But that it's the kind of situation where I don't think the average person -- I know that certainly I would not expect you, Judge, or me to consent to having someone search, um, videotape the front of my house or the side of it.

THE COURT: Well, look, you're calling it a "search." Both of our houses, um -- and I haven't checked, Ms. Thompson, but both of our houses, I would imagine, are on Zillow and they're on Google Earth and there are pictures taken at different times. One of mine has someone out in the yard. Not that I check all the time. But the picture of the house is there.

MS. THOMPSON: Is it on Zillow?

THE COURT: I will admit mine is, um, and I'm

not selling.

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(Laughter.)

MS. THOMPSON: Well I don't know because I haven't looked for mine. But I know that although Zillow is an enormous organization or business, it's not the government, and so while we might expect that Zillow, or Google Earth, will take a look at us every once in a while, we don't expect them to just focus on our home, and who comes and who goes and what time they come and what time they go, and who comes with them and who goes with them, and what time Ms. Moore goes to work and what time Nia Moore-Bush leaves the house and who she leaves with and what her children do, and who comes to pick up the children and who brings the children home. This is an extremely, um, it becomes extremely personal as it goes from day to day to day for an 8 month period of time. And one of the things that makes it so personal, it's this permanent record, and it can be searched over and over again by the government.

There's no reason to think that they are necessarily through searching this, um, video feed for what Ms. Moore is doing, but I think that the ability of the government to see what you are doing, when you are leaving your house, who is coming to your house, what time you are leaving, what time you are coming back, is

really pretty -- an invidious invasion of privacy. They may not -- they may say that they don't want to use all of that, but the fact of the matter is they have the ability to use all of that.

THE COURT: But surely you've, I'm sure, defended cases and I have presided over cases where on mere suspicion there have been stakeouts, for instance -- I don't recall one of 8 months, but I had a drug case, and I use it in teaching evidence, where there was -- and it just comes to mind, where there was a stakeout of a fellow by the name of Patrick Cole, um, in one of my cases, and no opinion was ever written on it, and I just recall the facts of the case, a physical stakeout, um, a police officer in plain clothes located across the street, and what he was doing is just that, he was watching when Mr. Cole -- and he was living with a young woman, and when the young woman came and went, that's what they were doing.

Now that was before *Carpenter* and before cell phones -- if one can imagine that civilization in fact existed before cell phones, but law enforcement did its work and there was no challenge at all, that I recall, and everyone thought "Well, that's fine police work that they are in fact scouting out those premises." I have no -- and I still have no problem with that, law

enforcement has been doing that for decades. I take it your argument is the pervasiveness of the pole camera for 8 months, a pole camera that will do what Ms. Barsky forthrightly explains it will do, it can zoom in and the like.

MS. THOMPSON: Right, it's that 8-month period of time, because certainly when you read *Carpenter* and the cases that precede it, you understand how convenient it is for the government to stick a pole camera up -- to stick a camera on a utility pole and just have it run, and that saves manpower and person-power, however you want to deal with it. And of course I don't know if in the Patrick Cole case that person was sitting there in a car with a camera. And if that person was sitting -- the law enforcement officer was sitting there with a camera, that might have raised a different issue for the court. But it was --

THE COURT: Well let me ask you this. There must be some period of time, without getting a warrant, that they can surveill suspicious premises? I mean won't you concede that?

MS. THOMPSON: Well, Judge, you know me well and I don't concede things very easily, but I do agree that the period of time in which somebody could do that without a warrant might be the period of time that

somebody would be able to stand there with a camera and take the pictures or sit in a car and take the pictures. But we all know that that's not going to happen for 8 months.

THE COURT: No, but the reason I ask that question, and I will ask it of the government, and whether or not we need an evidentiary hearing? Since it's -- the government agrees it was operative for 8 months. It might be worthwhile knowing when the photos of evidentiary value originated, in other words were they in the first week, month, et cetera, in the 7th month and the like? Do I have some line-drawing to do here?

MS. THOMPSON: I think, um, from what I can tell by the discovery is that the, um, the camera had been up mid May, June, July, August, September, October, and I think it was October and later that they started -- that the photographs that are -- that the government intends to use.

THE COURT: That the ones of evidentiary value appear to be late in the --

MS. THOMPSON: Very late. So there was a long period of time. And I can tell you, I did not provide a huge hard drive, because I'm not going to look at all of those pictures. I don't know whether there were --

THE COURT: No, I -- it's a proper question for the government and I will put it to them.

MS. THOMPSON: -- ambulances that came or -THE COURT: So as I -- and this does not, in
any way, shortchange your argument, you're in sort of
the 1L best-case approach, but *Carpenter* is what you're
really pinning your hat on, and you, um, point out that *Carpenter* is the most recent case and, um, is most
persuasive for your point?

MS. THOMPSON: I think *Carpenter* is persuasive. I know that there are courts that have rejected this argument on *Carpenter*, there are courts that have accepted it, and that a lot of it hinges on, oddly enough, the location of the property. And so this property, 120 Hadley Street, is located in a quiet residential area. And of course everyone suggests, "Well, the neighbors can walk up and down there and see what's going on," and all of that, and that's what you expect in your neighborhood, you expect your neighbors to know what's going on in the neighborhood. But you don't expect them to be taking real-time videos of everything that goes on at your house.

So this is qualitatively quite different than having your neighbor snap a shot of you in your house or by Google Maps or Zillow, this is a record that is a,

um, permanent record of what went on at your house for 8
months. And I think that that, um -- that Carpenter
will -- I think that will be addressed again in the
future. I think that 8 months is an incredibly long
period of time to have a camera in place.

I haven't -- of course there are other things I expect to address the Court about with regard to long periods of time and searches, but I do think that when you have a recording which you can search, that you have created a search situation, and that a court would be inclined perhaps to say, "Well, you've shown me probable cause to think that on Thursday and Friday of every other week people come around, so I can give you two weeks or I can give you Thursday and Friday for two weeks." But this is just a free-for-all, this is just anything you want all of the time for 8 months.

And I think that the Fourth Amendment -- when I look at the cases that have dealt with *Carpenter* and the pole-camera issue, what I see is -- I don't suspect -- I know this, I expect -- I expect privacy at my house, and so I could put up a sign in the yard that says "Don't come on my sidewalk," but you could still take a picture of my house. I could, um --

THE COURT: Well, you don't need a sign because anyone can do that. For one thing, if I

understand my property law, they can walk on the sidewalk because it's an easement -- at least the sidewalk in front of my house is an easement of the town. We need children to walk on the sidewalk to get to school and the like. And I can't stop people from taking pictures of the house. And for a Fourth Amendment analysis, I don't have an expectation that I can stop them.

MS. THOMPSON: Judge, I have a sidewalk that leads from the public sidewalk up to my house.

THE COURT: Oh, I see what you mean.

MS. THOMPSON: And I could put a sign there saying "You can walk on that sidewalk, but not this one. Don't come up here."

THE COURT: You could because --

MS. THOMPSON: I could build a huge fence in front of my house. I could put bushes in front of my house. But people aren't really expected to do that, their home is their place of privacy. And so you're not expected to have to build a wall around your house, people can't even afford that.

THE COURT: The language of the Founders is still good today, everything is what is reasonable in our society.

I think I understand your argument. It's well-

briefed.

Mr. O'Connor, you join in this argument because the evidence would come in against your client as well.

Do you have anything to add?

MR. O'CONNOR: Perhaps, your Honor, and I don't know if it would be helpful, but I'd like to add a few thoughts.

THE COURT: I'll be happy to hear you.

MR. O'CONNOR: So first with regard to, um, you know the comparison between security cameras and a pole camera, I think there's a couple of distinctions. One, security cameras are often visible. Part of the purpose sometimes of a security camera is to let people know that they're under surveillance so that they don't do anything --

THE COURT: I hear your -- you're arguing here now to the choir, it's the government who has cited some security camera cases. I don't think security cameras are the situation we have here. But it's not so much whether they're visible or invisible, a security camera is in position to provide security generally, that's why they're there, but here the government is targeting this premise, these premises, and evidently -- and they're certainly not going to argue to the contrary, because they believe there is suspicious activity of the people

coming and going from these premises, without probable cause, and that's where we start. So the security camera cases don't seem to this court to be apt.

I have a hard time saying it's a "search" because of course it's outside the close, it's on the public area, it's across the street. If you flew a drone up to the second-story window or something, that would be a different case, but that's not our case.

But go ahead.

MR. O'CONNOR: Yeah, so I do see what your Honor is saying, but I think the larger point that I was making is that with security cameras, knowing where they are, then with a limited purpose, you can preserve your -- or protect your own privacy by making choices about what actions you do. You don't have to be in the parking lot of the 7-11. Here they had no choice, this is where they live. This is the place that our Founders also recognized was our place of retreat, our place of peace, the place where we should expect to be free from the exercise of the arbitrary power of the government.

And so we now have a situation where the government can erect a discreet -- a hidden camera that has functions that are probably far beyond what a security camera does. This thing can be targeted clearly, at least at a minimum it can be zoomed. I

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don't know if it has the capacity to pan or not, we
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     don't know that, but it can zoom in and it can zoom in
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     to a relatively high magnification. Again we don't know
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     to what extent it can zoom in for purposes of
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     magnification. I don't know whether it has the capacity
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     to zoom in so tight on the front windows that now they
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     can see what's happening in the living room. But it
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     seems that --
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                THE COURT: I'm assuming "No," based upon what
     the record is and how Ms. Barsky answered my question,
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     that they can't do that. They can zoom in to see
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     license plates and at about that level of magnification.
     But I don't -- there's no evidence here that they could
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     see the interior of one's home.
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           Correct, Ms. Barsky?
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                MS. BURKART: It's "Burkart," your Honor.
                THE COURT: Ms. Burkart. Please forgive me.
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     I do apologize, Ms. Burkart. And I thank you for the
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     correction. But substantively the answer's "No," you
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     can't see inside?
                MS. BURKART: That's absolutely correct, your
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     Honor.
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                THE COURT: All right.
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                MR. O'CONNOR: So the point that your Honor
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     makes about zooming in to look at license plates, boxes
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are frequently left at our mail boxes. Somebody conducting surveillance, traditional surveillance, would have to figure out a way to get up to that box to see what the return address is, to see who you're leaving it for the mail person or --

THE COURT: I don't know as they can see return addresses, but they might see that it's a Prime box, for instance. But someone with binoculars can do that.

MR. O'CONNOR: Perhaps, your Honor, but not every single day for every single box that would be left there for every single license plates that comes and goes for 8 months. These are the things of life. These are associations. The people who may come by to meet with us, they could be liaisons, they could be trysts, they could be things that would otherwise be genuinely absent from spot surveillance or surveillance down the street. And I would go further to say that in a residence like Ms. Moore had -- and this is a quiet suburban neighborhood, if there was a couple of people sitting there eating ham sandwiches and drinking coffee and sitting around with binoculars, again she would have the capacity to protect her freedom, and I think that that is lost here.

And I would say with regard to where Carpenter

appears to be going, and your Honor's comments about Zillow or Google Earth, you know I moved recently, so I have an experience with Zillow. You actually have the capacity to go on Zillow, claim ownership of the home, and take the photographs -- for example of the interior of your house, off of Zillow. So you have some control of that.

THE COURT: Well again it's all very well to use analogies in order to understand what we're talking about. No one's talking about interior photographs and the like and nor was I suggesting that.

MR. O'CONNOR: But what I'm saying, your

Honor, is, you know, there's an expectation of privacy

that comes along with that capacity. This is a

collector of data and information --

THE COURT: But of course, just as you're arguing, but that's the interior of your home. They're not looking in the interior here.

MR. O'CONNOR: Right, and what's left is -there is something left though, your Honor, there's left
a picture of the exterior of my home taken in an
instant, it's one moment in time. My old house, the
Google photograph from above the earth had the old
above-ground pool that was taken down for years. So
these are moments in time, they're snapshots, they don't

contain the same data and information.

And I think that what *Carpenter's* recognizing is that, as surveillance goes from a couple of detectives in a car using binoculars, when they can do it, to this technology that's ubiquitous that gathers so much and has the capacity to gather so much evidence, that if we don't do something to cabin the government's use of it, we lose our freedoms entirely, and our perception of --

THE COURT: Judge Sorokin wrote, very carefully, and I hold him in enormous high regard, that he was bound by the First Circuit's precedent in **Boch**.

MR. O'CONNOR: In **Boch** or **Bucci**, your Honor?

THE COURT: **Bucci**. I'm sorry.

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I think because Carpenter post-dates it and so --

THE COURT: It does.

MR. O'CONNOR: And so the Supreme Court's recognizing that. You know the First Circuit at that point in time is following Supreme Court precedent that talks about a reasonable expectation of privacy as it's evolved from --

THE COURT: You answered my question. And so in order to -- I'm going to -- if I go your way, like you're depending on *Carpenter*, I'm depending on *Carpenter*, because otherwise I'm bound by *Bucci*. Right?

MR. O'CONNOR: Yes. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 All right, Ms. Burkart. And again my apologies, I do -- I do try to get people's names straight. 4 5 Would you answer the factual question, which was a 6 supposition on Ms. Thompson's part, that the evidence 7 you seek to produce comes in months when, 7 and 8? 8 MS. BURKART: Your Honor, I'm not actually certain particularly what photos we're going to use in 9 this stage in the case. If --10 11 THE COURT: But that would tend toward an 12 evidentiary hearing. What can you tell me on that? 13 MS. BURKART: I don't think so, your Honor, 14 because I think that the facts that are undisputed and 15 the case law that is undisputed makes it clear that the 16 government should be able to use images from any point 17 during that time. Bucci was an 8-month period of time. And I believe that Judge Sorokin's analysis is correct, 18 19 both pre and post Carpenter, and is controlling. 20 THE COURT: Why is it correct post Carpenter? 21 I mean they're dependent on Carpenter. And I think --22 MS. BURKART: Absolutely, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: And I think, analytically, rightly 24 so, whether that works or not is yet to be seen. 25 MS. BURKART: Carpenter dealt with a very

narrow -- it had a very narrow holding and it dealt with a very different type of technology. So certainly I think there's no dispute among the parties that our world has changed quite a bit in recent years in terms of how technology works and what is captured and that certainly has some reasonableness -- I'm sorry, some Fourth Amendment considerations. But the threshold issue here is not changed by *Carpenter* because it is what is reasonable? Is this a search? What is a reasonable expectation of privacy? *Carpenter* does not change what is reasonable about your expectation of privacy in the exterior of your home.

Carpenter said very clearly that they were making a narrow holding about cellular information, location information that was historical, um, they were very specific about it, and I think for good reason. The Carpenter court talked about the evolution of that technology and how historical cell-site information has gotten more and more precise, and they said to the point where at this stage they view that the data that's available through historical cell-sight information to be much like a tracker, that you could give, for a long period of time, very detailed encyclopedic information about where someone went, and that that could extend into interiors of spaces, that that could show

information about, um, which places of worship they went to, their travels, and they were very concerned with that level of intrusion, a tracker-like device on someone for an extended period of time. And they actually went so far as to, you know, say it's not -- it's any period of time, it's, you know, beyond 7 days was the issue in front of them on that. Why didn't they even need their holdings to say beyond the 6-day period of time? They thought that the threshold had been crossed. But they were very clear in *Carpenter* that that was the technology that they were talking about, that it was that increased ability to track people that they were concerned about.

Carpenter that have sought to apply the holding of Carpenter to a different set of technology, a different set of, um -- a different situation, and the courts have rejected that, um, pretty routinely. And in every case that I'm aware of in the pole-camera setting, the courts have rejected that. There is no post-Carpenter case discussing pole-camera technology.

Vargas, which was the case that was discussed by Judge Sorokin, it was raised by the defendants, was 2014. I did not find any, nor did I see in the defendant's briefs any -- and they're welcome to correct

me if I'm wrong, but I've seen no extension of the Carpenter decision to pole-camera data. I think that's because pole cameras are really not the type of thing that they were concerned about in Carpenter, it's fairly old-school. Whether it can zoom or not? It's a type of surveillance, a technique that law enforcement has been using for a long period of time.

It would be a very significant and I think an unwarranted extension of *Carpenter* to take the idea that *Carpenter* embraced -- you know, privacy rights are something that we have to consider more carefully in the area of new technology, and extend that to pole cameras, which have been used by law enforcement for a very long period of time.

And so I think the holding in *Bucci* is controlling. I think, um, Judge Sorokin's very careful analysis shows that he was quite sympathetic to the view that this emerging technology is something that could be of concern later, but he said very clearly *Bucci* controls here, and I don't think *Carpenter* changes that.

I think as a threshold issue we continue to have is this a reasonable expectation of privacy? It's not a search if there's not a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy. Objectively *Bucci* controls. They have not shown that. Subjectively none of the

defendants has put forward any type of affidavit or any type of information that suggests that subjectively they have demonstrated an expectation of privacy, again in that exterior of the home. Certainly some of this discussion has talked about the sanctity of the home, that's a serious Fourth Amendment concern, but there's no suggestion here that we have invaded that.

And one can imagine that if the technology were to become, you know, very significant, we were able to look inside homes and things like that, then those images, I would expect, would be the exact images the defendants would bring forward and say "This is a violation," but we don't see that here. We see the driveway and people coming and going from the driveway, the license plates, and sometimes you can see the drivers.

If there were a box or a series of boxes, your Honor, I would argue we could get that under mail cover, but that might be sort of an area that maybe we should take an evidentiary hearing, maybe we should look more closely. Is this some type of new technology that is really raising new concerns? We don't have that here. What we have is a failure to meet the threshold of a reasonable expectation of privacy, both objectively and subjectively, and nothing in *Carpenter* that overrules the holding in *Bucci*.

THE COURT: Don't think I'm going here, but let me just put it to you.

If I allowed this motion, in whole or in part, or allowed it for a period of the 8 months, that affects your whole case, doesn't it?

MS. BURKART: I think it's a significant impact, your Honor. As you know I've -- I've recently joined the case team and am getting up to speed in terms of the facts. I do think it's a threshold issue, though that doesn't have to be decided right here, and I do think it would be a line-drawing that's unwarranted under current case law if we were to say, you know, "We need to carve to this period of time or that period of time, this is reasonable, this isn't reasonable." I think the threshold issue under what is still good jurisprudence --

THE COURT: I understand that's your -- believe me I understand your argument. I'm thinking of what may happen because you are the, um --

Do the wiretap warrants depend on it?

MS. BURKART: The wiretap warrants discuss the pole cameras as part of discussing why it is necessary to have the wiretaps. So obviously one of the exhaustion requirements --

THE COURT: So that the pole camera was not

sufficient?

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MS. BURKART: Precisely, your Honor. And so that is actually the portion that's quoted here. And in some ways it cuts against the defendant's arguments that the pole camera is such a significant intrusion because what the defendant --

THE COURT: Because the wiretap intrusion requires the exhaustion of other things that you might do.

MS. BURKART: Precisely, your Honor. And it shows how limited the data that one can really get from a pole camera is. And it's where, I think, for instance the discussion of the one tree that partially obfuscates the view of the pole camera actually cuts to the government's position, is that, you know, this is on a utility pole across the street. And so when you're taking the position of, you know, what is reasonable for people to think is protected, what privacy interest is society prepared to recognize as reasonable? Knowing that it was obscured in part by a tree is something that actually shows that it was even less of an intrusion, um, than it might be had there been a full clear view of the entire exterior of the home. Again it really goes back to what objectively can one expect to be private about the exterior of the home.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'm going to take the matter under advisement.

Since we're here together and since trial is in the fairly-immediate offing, let's cover those things which -- let's use this as a final pretrial conference and go over certain matters.

The trial is starting on Monday, the 10th of June. The government will, by the 20th of May, if they have not already done so, make all those disclosures which are required under Local Rule 116. The government will, by the 3rd of June, disclose its witness list. The defense will make the reciprocal disclosure by Wednesday the 5th of June. Any stipulations, motions in limine, and the like, will be filed by Friday the 7th of June.

I propose -- well, let me ask a question. With the case in its present posture, how long do you think it will take to try this case -- without holding it to you, either Ms. Wagner or Ms. Burkart?

MS. WAGNER: Your Honor, just to clarify, the Court will be running or the trial will be running for half days or until 1:00 or 2:00?

THE COURT: Yes. I was sort of thinking maybe 9:30, but not going to lunch about 1:30, and maybe calling that a day.

MS. WAGNER: So 9:30 to 1:30. I think that

the government would be able to enter its case in chief 1 well under -- between 2 weeks and 3 weeks, depending on 2 3 cross-examination. THE COURT: It was 2 weeks the last time I 4 5 asked, now it's up to 2 or 3 weeks? 6 MS. WAGNER: Well it's 2 weeks, your Honor, we 7 could do that, I'm just anticipating there might be 8 extended cross-examination that the government can't anticipate. So for our case, we certainly could get it 9 10 in by 2 weeks. 11 THE COURT: I find it hard to think that you will in fact use up 2 weeks. 12 As a practical matter, Ms. Thompson, Mr. O'Connor, 13 14 you've tried these cases, how long do you really think 15 we're going to take on this? MS. THOMPSON: Well, I have to say, Judge, 16 that, um -- before I address that, I wanted to address 17 the government's motion for a protective order. 18 19 THE COURT: Oh, I had not addressed that. 20 MS. THOMPSON: Which I have opposed. 21 THE COURT: Oh, I see that, I see you've 22 opposed it. I'm not sure I really understand it. I've 23 not entered any such protective order. 24 MS. THOMPSON: And I am not getting discovery

because of the motion for a protective order.

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THE COURT: Well what discovery do you think 1 you're entitled to that you're not getting? 2 3 MS. THOMPSON: Well I'm not getting information about cooperating witnesses, um, which --4 5 the way I read the local rules, Judge, is if there was 6 going to be a motion for a protective order that was to 7 be filed during that 28-day period so that I would know 8 where I was going to, um -- I can't specify what I'm not getting because the government hasn't said in their 9 motion what they're not going to give. 10 11 THE COURT: I'll rule promptly on that. All right. Let's, um -- Mr. O'Connor, do you want 12 13 to take a shot at the question I posed? 14 MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I think that's 15 probably a pretty accurate description. THE COURT: A couple of weeks? 16 17 MR. O'CONNOR: Yeah, I think so. It could possibly bleed into that third week. I haven't tried a 18 19 case in front of your Honor, so I don't know how fast it 20 moves along. 21 THE COURT: Um, I hope I'm not terribly idiosyncratic, I -- most -- more than anything else I 22 23 desire a fair and impartial trial, time is not that 24 important, it's just we need to make effective use of 25

the time. That's why I ask. It's a criminal case, I

can't hold people to time, and I do not. 1 2 I'll impanel 14 jurors, that means the government 3 has 7 peremptories, the defense has 11. In a -- if both defendants go to trial, a multidefendant case, the 4 5 objection of one is the objection of all, unless 6 counsel, um, seek to take a different position and state 7 the different position. So it's not necessary for both 8 to object. 9 I'm open to questions about the conduct of the 10 trial. And I will rule promptly on this protective 11 order issue. 12 Questions by the government? 13 (Silence.) 14 THE COURT: Questions from the defense? 15 MR. O'CONNOR: None for Ms. Moore-Bush, your 16 Honor. 17 MS. THOMPSON: I have a matter in which I would just like to briefly make a record, Judge, that is 18 19 on the wiretap, which has been denied without a hearing, 20 it is our position that Ms. Moore was intercepted at all times without a warrant and without probable cause. 21 22 Every affidavit, um, says "We don't have probable cause 23 as to Ms. Daphne Moore." Every application says "We

lack probable cause as to Daphne Moore." She was

intercepted throughout the entire part of the wiretap.

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And I think that Judge Mastroianni made it clear that her conversations were not expected to be relative to the -- to one of the specified offenses, and they were not pertinent, could not be expected to be pertinent to those. And so I have a warrantless intercept as to Ms. Moore, her name was crossed out and her name thereafter was always put forward as someone as to whom they did not have probable cause on each of the three applications and each of the three affidavits. THE COURT: Her rights are saved. MS. THOMPSON: Thank you. In addition, I have filed a motion for relief from misjoinder. THE COURT: Why is there misjoinder with the case in its present posture? MS. THOMPSON: Well Ms. Moore-Bush is charged with firearms offenses. THE COURT: I understand. MS. THOMPSON: And Ms. Moore is not charged with any firearm offenses. THE COURT: I understand that. MS. THOMPSON: And it's not clear from anything that we see in the indictment whether money laundering involves firearms offenses as well as narcotics. So --

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THE COURT: I've -- the motion is denied.
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     Your rights are saved. We'll have a fair trial.
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           All right. Questions on the part of the
     government?
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                MS. WAGNER: Yes, your Honor, I have not had a
     trial in front of your Honor before, so I just have a
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     couple of small logistics questions.
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                THE COURT: Go ahead.
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                MS. WAGNER: The first is with respect to
     openings and closings --
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                THE COURT: 15 minutes a side. Well if two
     go, they both get 15 minutes, you get a half hour.
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     Closings, they get a half hour, you get an hour.
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                MS. WAGNER: With respect to chalks --
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                THE COURT: That's not an invitation to use
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     that time, that may be counterproductive, but it's your
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     case to try.
                MS. WAGNER: Thank you, your Honor.
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           With respect to using chalks in openings, how does
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     the Court --
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                THE COURT: I expect you to have shown them to
     the other side --
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                MS. WAGNER: Of course, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: -- and I'll entertain objections
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     prior to the opening, but they're perfectly fine, if
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1 there's no objection. MS. WAGNER: And then the last issue I wanted 2 3 to raise, your Honor, was how the Court wanted to handle transcripts? My understanding is that the initial 4 5 presentation of a transcript should not show the 6 speakers' names, and then once a witness has testified 7 about who is speaking on the recording, that it might be 8 entered. I just want to --9 THE COURT: I'm not so -- transcripts are not 10 going to the jury. 11 They're speaking in English, aren't they? MS. WAGNER: They are, your Honor, it's just 12 an aid. 13 14 THE COURT: Yeah, it's just an aid. So the 15 aid can have your agent's interpretation of who's 16 speaking and the like because they'll have the 17 transcripts only while the tapes are being played and at no other time and I will give a cautionary instruction. 18 19 MS. WAGNER: Excellent. Thank you, your 20 Honor. 21 THE COURT: All right, hearing nothing else, 22 we'll see you next Thursday, at least Mr. O'Connor, for 23 the evidentiary hearing. 24 MS. WAGNER: I'm sorry, your Honor, I did

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forget one thing.

How does the Court do jury selection? If you could just give a few seconds on it?

THE COURT: Yes. I do jury selection like this. I'll have the venire in the courtroom. You people will have given me what you think is appropriate as a precharge substantively and you will pose whatever questions -- you will in writing give me whatever questions you want me to ask. I will ask the questions I want to ask, which may include yours or not.

So I will introduce myself to the venire, ask them the questions, they will raise their hand if they would answer affirmatively. Then I'll have them up one by one, along with you, and I will inquire further of them to decide whether they should sit.

When I've made that determination, and they've stepped away, then if you disagree, either side, you will say, "Judge, he should be challenged for cause." I will rule. And if I decide to bring back someone I've excused, they won't have left the courtroom by that time, I will say "Oh, wait a minute, come back and sit down." Then when I have an indifferent panel, I'll fill the box with 14 jurors.

I'll have each of the jurors introduce themselves and tell us where the -- well they don't need to introduce themselves, but they'll tell us where they

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work and where their spouse works, and what -- and in a
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     few words what they do there. That way you'll get to
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     hear them and see how they answer questions and the
     like.
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           When that's done, we'll approach the sidebar and
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     you will exercise your peremptories. Then without
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     filling the box the defense will exercise their
     peremptories. Then the, um, in the first round we'll
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     excuse those people and fill the box with remaining
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     jurors. And in the second round the defense will go
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     first, so it's fair and so on and so forth.
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           The last two jurors picked are going to be the
     alternates, but they will not know it until the trial is
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     over. I will pick the foreperson. I'm very strict on
15
     Batson.
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           Is that sufficient explanation?
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                MS. WAGNER: Yes, thank you, your Honor, that
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     was very helpful.
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                THE COURT: All right.
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           Anything else? (Silence.) Very well.
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                MS. THOMPSON: Judge, are you committed to
     selecting the foreperson?
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                THE COURT: I am.
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           We'll recess.
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                THE CLERK: All rise.
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(Ends, 3:00 p.m.)
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                      CERTIFICATE
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             I, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER,
 6
     do hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true
 7
     and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes,
8
     before Judge William G. Young, on Monday, May 13, 2019,
9
     to the best of my skill and ability.
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     /s/ Richard H. Romanow 5-31-19
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     RICHARD H. ROMANOW Date
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